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Harold James is a Professor of History and International Affairs, jointly appointed to the Woodrow Wilson School and Princeton University's Department of History. His research interests include economic and financial history, and modern German history. Professor James' recently released book is called The Roman Predicament: How the Rules of International Order Create the Politics of Empire (Princeton University Press, 2006).

In late April the Wilson School's External Affairs department interviewed James about his new book, and what the "Roman predicament" means for international relations and globalization today.

Woodrow Wilson School (WWS) - Why is your book called "The Roman Predicament"?

Harold James (HJ) - Have you noticed that suddenly everyone seems to be talking about Rome and about classical analogies to modern empires? The fundamental issue I believe is that in any system of international order, we tend to think that you need universal rules, and that these are going to generate stability, peace and prosperity; all of the good things that everybody wants in life. And what actually happens is that in this order people start to worry about the rules that govern them. They think these rules are too complex, or that they create inequalities or injustices.

But above all, historically, people perceive that the rules of a particular international order in which they live reflect certain power interests, so that they're really not universally valid rules or universally equitable rules, and because they are so much linked to particular interests to a major power within the international system, the rules begin to appear as illegitimate. And so the story of the ancient Roman empire, which people use as a historical model to explain this often recurring pattern, begins under Augustus with this beautiful vision of universal prosperity, and the Roman empire ends with revolts at the center against various inequalities and injustices, but above all revolts at the empire's periphery, far from Rome's center. So, the basic theme of the book concerns both the feeling throughout the ages that there's something illegitimate about an international order, and the sense that we've been here before.

The book delves into the concept of a conquering empire. And many empires like Rome tend to expand, in large part because they are continually challenged at the periphery. By that I mean there are incursions and there are elements across the empire who disrupt the peaceful course of commerce. Consequently, empires are always tempted to feel that they need to add on a little bit more here and there to protect their imperial interests. And as an empire adds on a little bit more it becomes more costly, because the further you are stretched geographically from the center, whether in Rome or other imperial systems, the more costly empire becomes. I believe that is a generalizable model for empires. Empires will worry about providing security to their basic interests, their core interests; but that always seems to take them further and further across the world.

WWS - What lessons on globalization can the ancient republic of Rome give us today?

HJ - In thinking about the history of globalization, I see cycles of movement towards integration, which requires some kind of universalizable rule within an international order, and then a reaction and a rejection of the rule-based order. You see, I don't believe this current wave of globalization we're experiencing now is unprecedented and really that novel. There are analogies to globalization throughout history, for example most strikingly in the late 19th and 20th centuries. Economic historians have explored and discussed globalization during these periods a great deal. You can also see analogies in the growth of the Chinese imperial system in the 10th, 11th, 12th centuries, and as well as the very important early example of the Roman empire. Another example would be the great age of European explorations, in the 15th and 16th centuries. These historical episodes all end in the same way, with major wars. And that is a rather gloomy story. In terms of the debate about globalization, one of the things I've always thought is that globalization is much more vulnerable than some people like to think. It's easily possible to conceive of ways in which it can be derailed.

WWS - In the book you also talk about the British empire. Do you see the span of the British empire following the same historical pattern as the Roman empire?

HJ - Yes, very much so. One obvious comparison of imperial systems, and of international orders, concerns the costs and difficulties of communications. Great Britain had a core set of interests in the British Isles, and then in India. But in order to connect these interests, Britain needed to go through places in the world that were difficult and dangerous; there were continuously contested frontiers. Some of the contested frontiers then are by chance those of today- say Afghanistan, where the Russian political system rubbed against the British imperial system. In the end imperial systems depend on the ability to maintain communications networks from the core of the empire to the periphery. And even today in the age of relatively cheap transportation of all kinds of goods, we still need a lot of energy to transport things - it's a very important issue - and it does explain why energy issues are central to the security and the perceived self-interests of big political orders.

WWS - You assert that a rule-based world order eventually subverts and destroys itself, creating the need for imperial action. Where do you see this occurring today, or in the recent past?

HJ - As an economic historian I deal with it more in those areas that concern economic and trade interactions. First of all, today the World Trade Organization (WTO) is more and more politically contested by different members of the international community, by states but also by NGOs. The sentiment that what is happening in the WTO is merely an expression of the interests of some major power is very powerful and prominent. WTO-like mechanisms actually worked better in the relative political obscurity of the WTO's predecessor, the GATT. But when many people think of problems in international governance, they frequently argue that more openness might be the solution to defuse resentments and hostilities. I actually think that openness sometimes causes the problems, because you see these underlying issues much more clearly. So because the WTO is more prominent than GATT it has the potential to set off a powerful backlash; in other words, radical objections to the way its rules operate.

I see these kinds of debates in the monetary order as well, and also in the debate about international corporate governance. Whose accountancy rules should be used in other countries, in a world which is increasingly interconnected? Does the imposition of a common system of accounting rules really favor the big industrial countries, the Europeans or the United States? Those are issues that I think are really very central in the debates that are ongoing.

WWS - In the book you predict that two forces, liberal international order and empire, will one day feed on each other to create a shake-up in globalization. How do you see this happening?

HJ - I think that we're already seeing this shake-up. There's a colossal shifting of the tectonic plates of the world's security and economic infrastructure, and we're not very well equipped to handle this. I believe existing international institutions need to be substantially modified to do so. But when you start talking about the modification of institutions you start getting to this question of, well, who exactly in the international order is going to redesign them? And that's why I think issues such as the reform of the United Nations, reform of the International Monetary Fund, are so contentious and intractable. Here I'm not talking about a big collapse, but rather of strains in international governance. As the strains increase, the world becomes more vulnerable to some unexpected shock. Trying to predict future surprises is obviously a hard game. If you're asking what kind of events could be the equivalent of June 28, 1914, when the assassination of an archduke set off a chain reaction that brought the world into war, people will come up with very different answers. But it seems to me that the modern equivalent of that kind of catalyst might be some kind of nuclear exchange - and nuclear weapons are clearly more easily available.

WWS - The cover of the book features what could be described as a rather imperial-looking bust of George W. Bush in the garb of a Roman emperor, complete with toga and crown. Looking to today, do you see the U.S.-led invasion and occupation of Iraq as a characteristic of an empire, or an empire in the making?

HJ - I think it's an exact illustration of the kind of problem I'm talking about, where actions are perceived in different and incommensurable ways. One side sees a striving to enforce rules in an open world order, the other sees arbitrary power and force. To be clear, I'm sure that the conception, design, and planning of the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq was not thought of in terms of empire, but really, what I happen to think about that history doesn't matter. What matters is that a lot of people throughout the world think that it is the action of an empire. We also find it hard to understand how certain parts of the world see America's behavior. For us it's a question of restoring human rights, and fostering democracy and an open international order in the Middle East, and our policy makers feel that the recipients should be grateful for this kind of intervention. But from many other perspectives, America's actions are interpreted in a completely different way. The book's cover captures the ambiguity of the verdict: some will see President Bush as a great leader, others will see the picture of an imperial figure

WWS - How can we resolve the Roman predicament you describe? Or are we doomed to have history repeat itself?

HJ - I thought a lot about this as I was writing the book, and you can tell from the kind of conversation we're having that I feel quite gloomy about the possibility of resolving this predicament. I feel particularly gloomy about how to resolve it in a world that thinks in terms of rules, and in terms of processes and interactions.