David Lewis, Associate Professor of Politics and Public Affairs at the Woodrow Wilson School, has authored the book The Politics of Presidential Appointments: Political Control and Bureaucratic Performance  (Princeton University Press, 2008).

In the wake of Hurricane Katrina, many observers questioned whether the large number of political appointees in the Federal Emergency Management Agency contributed to the agency's poor handling of the catastrophe, ultimately costing hundreds of lives and causing immeasurable, long-term pain and suffering to victims.

One way presidents can influence the permanent bureaucracy is by filling key posts with people who are sympathetic to their policy goals. But if a president's appointees lack competence and an agency fails in its mission--as happened during and after Katrina--the president is accused of employing his friends and allies to the detriment of the public.

The Politics of Presidential Appointments examines how and why presidents use political appointees and how their choices impact government performance--for better or worse.  Through case studies Lewis analyzes presidential appointments dating back to the 1960s and reveals which jobs went to appointees, which agencies were more likely to have appointees, how the use of appointees varied by administration, and how it affected agency performance.

Lewis argues that presidents politicize even when it hurts performance--and often with support from Congress--because they need agencies to be responsive to presidential direction. He shows how agency missions and personnel--and whether they line up with the president's vision--determine which agencies presidents target with appointees, and he sheds new light on the important role patronage plays in appointment decisions. 

Commenting on Lewis’ book, Steve Kelman of Harvard University writes "Political science is sadly currently producing few scholars concerned with improving the management of the federal government. David Lewis is a striking exception. This well-argued, methodologically rigorous study of the baleful impact of the increasing number of political appointees in agencies on government performance makes an important contribution both to the academic literature and to an important practical debate about governance."